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 United Kingdom 
 
By Caroline Sawyer and Helena Wray1 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The citizenship regime of the UK is a mixture of ius sanguinis and ius soli, and is 
arguably relatively generous in its naturalisation schemes. This remains true even in 
the current political climate when the government is committed to severely curtailing 
‘net migration’ and has enhanced and made increasing use of its powers to remove 
citizenship.  The British regime for attributing citizenship at birth to those born in the 
UK fits well within the prevailing systems of Europe and accords with the European 
Convention on Nationality, although, in common with most other jurisdictions, the 
UK has not ratified that Convention. Naturalisation is possible through regular 
residence in any capacity but settled status must always be obtained first and must 
usually be held for at least one year and this will only be granted as a consequence of 
certain types of immigration leave.2   
However, the implications of the partial loss of ius soli in 1983 and subsequent 
events have arguably entailed a fundamental shift in the meaning of being British. 
Historically, the system has been indistinct in ways that could be inclusive or 
exclusive but, as the entire immigration and nationality regime from initial entry 
through to deprivation of nationality has been toughened, the absence of unassailable 
rights, even for long-term residents or nationals, may be felt by some groups and 
individuals in particular. Just as the abandonment of responsibility towards non-UK 
British subjects in the later twentieth century demonstrated many ethical and legal 
problems, so the shift from residence as the basis for belonging to a stricter system of 
entitlement or exclusion raises many questions of principle and justice.  
Perhaps the defining characteristic of British citizenship law historically has 
been its ambiguity which has been observable in respect of terminology and of rights; 
of legal boundaries; and of conceptual boundaries, with a particular blurring between 
citizenship and immigration statuses.  Changes over the past decade have resolved 
some historical uncertainties and injustices but have also succeeded in creating new 
ones. 
 
1.1 Ambiguity of terminology and of rights 
Terms such as ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’, along with other forms of membership 
status, have not each represented a single identifiable set of rights.  This confusion is 
closely linked to the UK’s history as a retreating imperial power. The scope of British 
nationality has shrunk from including everyone born in a vast empire at the end of the 
                                                
1 Caroline Sawyer was the author of the report published in 2009. Helena Wray updated and revised 
the report comprehensively in 2012 and in 2014. The present version  covers citizenship-related 
legislative developments up to December 2014.  
2 Settled status requires ‘ordinary residence’ in the UK with no immigration restrictions on one’s stay 
i.e. indefinite leave to remain  (s. 33 Immigration Act 1971). 
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 nineteenth century to excluding even some people born in the territory of the UK 
itself. However, there has been reluctance to openly acknowledge the exclusionary 
implications of this withdrawal so that legal categories have not always reflected the 
paucity of rights to which they give effect. Within the overall category of ‘British 
nationality’, only the sub-category of ‘British citizen’ necessarily entails the right to 
live in the UK. The increasing scope for and use of deprivation of citizenship and new 
proposals to withdraw passports from those engaging in conflict outside the UK 
unless they submit to draconian in-country controls suggests that even this privileged 
status is now conditional and provisional and functions in ways previously associated 
with immigration control. Modern British citizenship stands in stark contrast to the 
previous inclusive conceptualisation founded only on birth in the territory of the 
British Empire.  
This shrinkage of citizenship has been accompanied by the establishment of an 
exceptionally complex system regulating immigration status. The question of status 
has become practically important as more and more aspects of day-to-day life are 
governed by proof of entitlement through status rather than, as before, through 
residence. The last two decades have seen a torrent of legislation redefining the 
respective rights of citizens and non-citizens that is still continuing.3 Part of this has 
been oriented towards preventing unwanted admissions but a major and new theme 
has been to control access to services by those without immigration status and this has 
implications for citizens. The UK has no system of personal identity documents apart 
from (voluntarily acquired) passports, driving licences etc. so it can be difficult to 
ascertain a person’s citizenship or immigration status.4  Nonetheless, employers and 
educational establishments must now check all employees’ entitlement to work or 
study and monitor aspects of compliance. The Immigration Act 2014 requires checks 
on immigration status or nationality by landlords, banks and the driving licence 
authorities (not all of these had been fully implemented at the time of writing). While 
these are classified as forms of immigration control, and long term migrants now 
carry biometric residence permits, citizens must also demonstrate their eligibility in 
ways that were not previously necessary, even if plans for identity cards for citizens 
have been abandoned. In addition, it is not easy to ascertain exactly what rights follow 
from which status nor even what that status may be.5 This may be a problem for non-
citizens but also for citizens or those who had always believed themselves to be 
citizens; it is still possible that a non-British person may have greater rights (for 
example, as an EU citizen, a settled person or a Commonwealth citizen with the right 
of abode) to live in the UK than an overseas-based British national, who may have no 
right to enter the UK at all. It is also possible that an individual who was born or has 
lived since childhood in the UK may discover that they are not a citizen only when 
they try to obtain a passport or have to prove their entitlement for another reason.  
 
                                                
3 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993; Asylum and Immigration Act 1996; Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999; Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; Asylum (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc) Act 2004; Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; Identity Cards Act 2006; UK Borders 
Act 2007; Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The cultural change in attitude to refugees 
and asylum seekers (the latter term being a contemporary new invention), who went from being heroes 
of their own lives to being “bogus” and outcasts is variously attributed to the arrival of non-Europeans 
in large numbers, or the end of the Cold War; it followed, however, rather than preceded the change in 
the attribution of citizenship to the children of foreign nationals. 
4 Identity for formal working purposes such as the payment of tax and the attribution of social security 
contributions was assessed through the National Insurance Number system. It was very easy to obtain 
such a number, or several, or to use someone else’s, particularly until late 2005 when there was some 
media scandal about this method of establishing an official identity without any central checking of 
entitlement.  
5 See for example the continuing ambiguity of the status of Temporary Admission (Sawyer and Turpin 
2005). 
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 1.2 Ambiguity of the law 
Ascertaining legal rights in nationality law is not straightforward, although it is not 
the only opaque area of British law. While most important changes to nationality laws 
have been made by primary legislation, parliamentary scrutiny has varied from the 
intense to the relatively casual and the consequences of apparently simple changes 
may not be immediately apparent. For example, in 2004, seemingly by accident, the 
Parliament legislated to make orders for deprivation of citizenship effective instantly 
rather only after all rights of appeal against deprivation had been exhausted, with 
citizenship to be restored in the event that the appeal was successful. This apparently 
minor change has had a dramatic impact on those (the majority) whose citizenship is 
removed while they are outside the UK as, without British citizenship they are unable 
to enter the UK and therefore exercise their appeal rights effectively (Harvey 2014: 
340; Ross 2014). In addition, statutes often permit important details to be decided 
with less scrutiny by regulation (secondary legislation made by Ministers, with or 
without the requirement that Parliament approve it overtly).  
Even if an Act of Parliament has been passed, it may still not be in force. 
Some legislation, especially that passed in a hurry or amidst media flurry, never 
comes into force and may ‘lie on the statute book’ or be quietly repealed later. The 
changes to nationality law enacted in the ss. 39-41 Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009, for example, have not been implemented but remain valid law 
and still could be. The usual practice is for ‘commencement orders’, which are 
secondary legislation made under enabling powers in the Act itself, to be used to 
implement new legislation so that understanding the correct position requires access 
to all up to date primary and secondary legislation, which is only readily ascertainable 
on specialist subscription databases used by lawyers to which the general public does 
not usually have access. 
Although most nationality law is now governed by statute, this often provides 
for discretion in decision-making. For example, s.6 of the British Nationality Act 
1981 provides that, if certain conditions are met, the Home Secretary ‘may, if he 
thinks fit’, not ‘shall’, naturalise an individual.  Laws on deprivation of citizenship 
due to conduct are expressed in terms of the ‘opinion’ of the Secretary of State as to 
the desirability of removing the individual’s citizenship.  In addition, aspects of 
nationality law (although not immigration law) are still governed by royal prerogative, 
in effect, residual executive discretion. For instance, the issue of passports is still a 
prerogative matter (although there are plans to legislate; see 3.3 below). 
Immigration law, which often affects nationality entitlements, is mostly found 
in rules of practice which are published and subject to limited parliamentary scrutiny 
but which change frequently.6  In 2013, for example, the rules changed eight times. 
Individual officers have considerable discretion in the application of the law, and 
there is relatively little supervision of day to day implementation. Some of the 
guidance issued to decision-makers is now publicly available on government 
websites.7  
Reasons for refusal of naturalisation are now given but that is a relatively 
recent development, implemented by statute in 2002 after the Court of Appeal found 
                                                
6 The new rules come into effect on the date specified in them unless disapproved by parliamentary 
resolution within 40 days. If they are rejected (a rare occurrence), the old rules persist for 40 days while 
something more acceptable is found. Changes to the rules now published promptly on the relevant 
government website. Following the case of Alvi discussed elsewhere in this report,any rules which 
affect rights to enter or remain must be included in the immigration rules. 
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/statementsofchanges/.  
7 The nationality instructions are available at: https://www.gov.uk/immigration-operational-
guidance/nationality-instructions. 
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 that there was a duty to explain a refusal in at least some instances.8 Most nationality 
decisions do not carry a right of appeal (for difficulties in exercising those appeal 
rights that do exist, see 3.3 on deprivation of citizenship below) but the legality of a 
decision may be judicially reviewed. Compared to immigration and asylum law, there 
is relatively little jurisprudence on which to draw, and human rights and EU law have 
not made a mark in this area. The Home Office will often cede a claim shortly before 
a hearing if it fears an unfavourable precedent. In the absence of much legal aid 
provision, it takes a particularly determined and fortunate litigant even to begin 
proceedings, and cases that are settled will not change the apparent law on which 
others are entitled formally to base their own claims. 
 
1.3 Ambiguity of conceptual boundaries 
Historically, and in common with other common law countries, the UK operated on 
the basis of complete ius soli, a concept that, as discussed below, originated in ideas 
about allegiance that predate the modern concept of nationality. Elements of ius 
sanguinis have also been present, and nationality was overwhelmingly inclusive. This 
was congruent with British expansionism which, combined with a pragmatic 
attribution of various legal statuses, meant that the legal and physical boundaries of 
Empire were uncertain, with ramifications that are still felt. 
Inclusivity was checked by the British Nationality Act 1948 where the UK 
recognised that independent Commonwealth countries would determine their own 
rules on nationality even if the unifying concept of ‘subject’ remained. Inclusivity was 
definitively reversed by the British Nationality Act 1981 although, in reality, the 
reversal was anticipated by the incursions into the free movement of citizens and 
subjects created by previous immigration legislation (Commonwealth Immigrants 
Acts 1962 and 1968 and Immigration Act 1971); it was already apparent that an open 
model did not suit new conditions.  
The 1981 Act partially removed the right of ius soli, reserving it, in respect of 
those born after 1st January 1983, to the children of settled residents or British 
citizens. This was influenced by concern that British citizenship was being attributed 
to the children of transient parents, and this change predated the same move by other 
formerly British countries such as Ireland or New Zealand.9 Although mitigated by a 
relatively straightforward registration process for the stateless and for children whose 
future was later shown to lie in the UK, it represented a fundamental change to the 
underlying principle upon which membership was recognised. The effects of this are 
only now becoming fully apparent as a generation has grown up without the guarantee 
of nationality in their place of birth.  
There is little in the way of a clear and unified national ethnic or cultural myth 
to justify the pragmatic mixture of ius sanguinis and ius solis which the 1981 Act 
initiated and later developments have only underscored the absence of a collective 
sense of what Britishness means. Nationality has long been treated as an extension of 
the immigration system despite attempts by the Labour government to make 
naturalisation into a more meaningful personal commitment through the introduction 
of integration tests and citizenship ceremonies in the mid-2000s. Even the integration 
requirements are, in practice, immigration tests as they apply also to most migrants 
seeking settlement and are not retaken for naturalisation. 
This inverted relationship, by which immigration concerns have driven 
citizenship policy rather than the other way round, was evident in other ways in the 
1981 Act. In particular, the creation of a hierarchy of citizenship statuses (discussed 
                                                
8 s. 7 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ; R v SSHD (ex p. Al-Fayed ) no. 1 [1998] 1 WLR 
763 
9 Ireland lost the ius soli after 2004 and New Zealand after 2005. 
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 below), in which only British citizenship actually carried the right to live in the UK, 
institutionalised within citizenship law the immigration policy of the past two 
decades, which had been to withdraw rights of entry from non-white colonial subjects 
including those who were still citizens. 
If there is no underpinning national narrative that sets nationality law aside 
from the instrumental concerns of immigration law, then nationality law is likely to 
evolve in harmony with these. While the worst injustices of the 1981 Act have been 
remedied, new forms of exclusion have emerged. The Labour government, which lost 
power in 2010, attempted a general ‘rationalisation’ of both immigration and 
citizenship rules to make them more rigorous, systematic and conditional. Having 
introduced a points-based system based on the Australian model into the immigration 
system in 2008, the government expressed the intention of extending it to settlement 
(permanent residence) and citizenship. Citizenship was to be earned through 
compliance, contribution and economic self-reliance, to be judged against objective 
and measurable criteria. These complex plans were abandoned by the Coalition 
government that came to power in 2010 who have focused their energies on reducing 
opportunities for initial entry and settlement and on increasing powers and use of 
deprivation of citizenship, creating new hierarchies so that many citizens’ right to 
reside in the UK is barely more secure than that of migrants (and much less secure 
than other EU citizens). There is still no clear consensus on what the rules of 
Britishness ought to be, and no political will to address the problems of those who fall 
outside new categories of exclusion. At the broader social and political level, the 
legislative changes reflect and drive a restructuring of the philosophy of belonging, 
foreignness and exclusion that is proving very uncomfortable for some. 
 
1.4 The internal national and jurisdictional divisions of the UK 
The UK is not generally a legal jurisdiction save for external international purposes. 
Its internal territory is divided into constituent countries which have different legal 
traditions and rules for many purposes other than nationality and citizenship, and the 
current trend is towards greater devolution of power to those countries, particularly 
Scotland. For most internal legal purposes, the three major constituent jurisdictions of 
England and Wales (a united jurisdiction), Scotland and Northern Ireland have 
separate legal systems. England, Wales and Scotland constitute Great Britain; the 
Kingdom that is united is that of Scotland with England and Wales, which occurred in 
1701.10  
The UK also includes numerous smaller islands such as the Isle of Wight, 
Lundy or the Scilly Isles, but not for most purposes the Channel Islands (the 
Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey, the latter of which includes Sark and Alderney) or 
the Isle of Man. These are Crown dependencies but self-governing, even if, by virtue 
of s. 50 (1) British Nationality Act 1981, they are part of the UK for nationality 
purposes. ‘The British Islands’ is a legal term including the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man as well as Great Britain (Interpretation Act 1978, Sch 1) but excluding the 
Republic of Ireland; this term is however rarely used. The British Isles are a 
geographical concept, and include what is now the Republic of Ireland, whose citizens 
often have a privileged status in British law because of the historical union of England 
and Ireland which took effect in 1801 and persisted, sorely resented in Ireland, until 
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 left only the northern part still united 
with mainland Britain. 
                                                
10 The English conquest of Wales was promulgated in the Statute of Rhuddlan (also Statute of Wales) 
1284, and later formal union in the early sixteenth century providing for Welsh representation at 
Westminster was or is seen by the Welsh as confirming the annexation of Wales by England, though 
the monarchical Tudor dynasty was of Welsh origin. 
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 Small territories outside the UK but which still come under British jurisdiction 
and sovereignty are known as British Overseas Territories (formerly British 
Dependent Territories) and are listed in schedule 6 of the British Nationality Act 
1981. They include Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, Montserrat, the 
British Indian Ocean Territory and the Cayman Islands. Most of those who were 
British Dependent Territories Citizens became British citizens with the right of abode 
under the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 (see 2.5 below).  
Larger territories which were once part of the Empire are now independent.11 
Some such territories were self-governing dominions.12 Colonies were governed by 
the Crown via its appointed governor.13  The Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey 
and the Isle of Man are self-governing Crown dependencies but are within the UK for 
nationality purposes. These countries and their populations have close ties with the 
UK which are reflected in the provisions of British immigration and citizenship law 
and practice.  
The Ireland Act 1949 stated that Ireland was not a foreign country and that 
Irish citizens are not aliens. They can vote whilst resident in the UK and the Common 
Travel Area means that the borders between the Republic of Ireland and the UK are 
open.14  
Living in the UK are substantial numbers of people with both British and 
another nationality (where this is permitted by the other state), and many permanent 
British residents who are only citizens of the other country. For the latter, it 
historically made little difference to everyday life and entitlements whether one was 
‘settled’ as a citizen or as a permanent resident. The difference became more relevant 
when there was a policy of releasing British citizens in the United States detention 
centre at Guantanamo Bay but not British residents.15 Enhanced powers of deportation 
of convicted criminals without citizenship have also emphasised the difference 
although powers of deprivation of citizenship are again closing the gap. 
This report will consider first of all the historical constructions that have 
shaped the existing law, especially the implications of monarchy and the legacy of 
Empire. It will then explore the current citizenship regime. The concluding section 
provides an overview of the recent and current trajectory of British nationality and 
citizenship law. 
                                                
11 For lawyers these are generally identifiable as having a common law system, rather than a civil law 
system as is prevalent in most of Europe. This also applies to the United States of America, though it 
became independent somewhat earlier than most. 
12 Such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, South Africa, and the Irish Free State, as 
well as India, Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). 
13 As for example the Colony of Virginia (subsequently part of the US); Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and Ceylon / Sri Lanka before they became dominions; and a number of smaller territories 
such as Trinidad, British Guiana, Bermuda, Jamaica, Fiji, Belize, Sierra Leone, Granada, Lesotho, St 
Helena. 
14 The Common Travel Area is a legacy of the historical union of mainland Britain and the island of 
Ireland; there are theoretically no border controls. Despite the publication of a consultation 
‘Strengthening the Common Travel Area’ in July 2008 (ref 289423), its effective ending was proposed 
in the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill in January 2009. The relevant provision was however 
removed from the Bill in April 2009, before it was enacted. 
15 This was reversed, and the permanent residents were also released, when US policy changed. (Al-
Rawi and others vs Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another [2006] 
EWHC (Admin) 972, [2006] EWCA Civ 1279. 
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 2.  Historical background and changes 
 
Historically, Britain has been a country of individual rather than national membership 
expressed through a vertical relationship with the Sovereign. There was substantial 
movement between different parts of the Empire and also substantial emigration from 
the United Kingdom, as well as the coming and going of expatriates generally, but – 
as one might expect in a system with largely imperceptible territorial boundaries – 
this is relatively little regulated or discussed in relation to citizenship rights.  
 
2.1 The link between immigration and citizenship in Britain 
Because of the historical lack in Britain of a concept of the nation as defined by blood 
and descent, nationality has always been seen as the logical consequence of 
immigration.  Identifiable waves of immigrants could historically be identified with a 
push factor in the country of origin as well as, frequently, positive encouragement for 
them to come to Britain as traders or craftsmen. Immigration was also thus entwined 
with the idea of asylum, the UK being unusual in still considering the two together 
into the twenty-first century. A system of immigration control was first instituted only 
in 1905, as a response to unwanted immigration mostly of poor Jews from Eastern 
Europe and Russia but with an exemption for political and religious refugees.16 
Although immigration was not restricted until the early twentieth century, 
aliens did not always have the same rights as subjects but but the difference between 
those who belonged and those who did not was not always significant. The concept of 
denizenship, which operated from the late thirteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, 
is reflected even today in the remnants of the idea of settlement, rather than 
citizenship, as the fount of belonging. This is reinforced by the very high cost of 
naturalisation and recent legal changes that have made citizenship easier to lose; 
holding ‘indefinite leave to remain’ rather than citizenship suits many people who 
prefer not to naturalise but need to have a firm status of formal belonging in daily 
domestic life. 
 
2.2 Historical ideas of allegiance 
The establishment of a Church of England in the sixteenth century identified 
allegiance to the monarchy with adherence to religious practice, but was directed 
principally at anti-Catholicism, reflecting the political background and the break with 
the Roman church.17 In the absence of any developed sense of formal tribalism, while 
ius soli persisted, the British-born children of immigrants could be as British as 
anyone. But an ambiguous citizenship may also be unexpectedly fragile. Borders open 
to immigration and emigration may be easily overlooked as boundaries to exclusion 
as well as inclusion. The exclusion of subject populations is not new. There is a right 
not to be exiled in Clause 29 of Magna Carta (1225), but the expulsion of Jews who 
were born British subjects in 1292 is still reflected over 700 years later in the exile of 
                                                
16 Aliens Act 1905. Notably, although it is often said that the 1905 Act was designed to prevent poor 
refugees from Eastern Europe from arriving in Britain, the Act contains an exemption for refugees, in 
recognition of the common law of asylum (sect. 1 (3)). 
17 Thus, for example, early domestic legislation as to the recognition of religious-based personal laws 
of marriage included Quaker and Jewish ceremonies as well as those of the Church of England, but 
excluded Catholics, whose allegiance to Rome engendered specific political fears (Lord Hardwicke’s 
Act 1753). The monarch, who of course is defined by a different ius sanguinis from the ordinary 
citizen, still may not be, or marry, a Catholic (Act of Settlement 1701), though this is currently under 
review. Because the monarch is also Head of the Church of England, resolution of this does present 
difficulties. 
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 British citizens, usually from a visible ethnic minority, through deprivation of 
citizenship and exclusion orders. There is also the inglorious expulsion of the Chagos 
Islanders from their homes in the British Indian Ocean Territory (discussed in 3.5 
below and attempts to expel the parents of citizen  children even when this means the 
exile of the child, partially checked by the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD 
[2011] UKSC 4 (discussed below).   
 
2.3 Establishment of ius soli 
The earliest confirmation of ius soli is Calvin’s Case, decided in 1608 just after King 
James VI of Scotland’s became also King James I of England.18 It was found that a 
person born in Scotland after the Union of the two countries was a subject of the King 
of England (and therefore entitled to hold land in England). Ius soli continued to 
thrive in a country embarking on a strong imperialist phase, gathering in territories 
and their peoples. It was not until the later twentieth century that Britain preferred to 
shed people as it shed territories, and the process is not yet completed. Britain has also 
always been a country of emigration as well as transit. Many families leaving central 
and Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century ended up staying permanently in the UK 
although they had intended to use it only as a transit to America. In the late twentieth 
century, the similar phenomenon of apparent transit passengers disembarking at, for 
example, Heathrow to claim asylum led to the instigation of transit visas, which are 
now routine. Emigration however has never excited legislative concern other than as 
to the money that people might take with them; exchange controls are within living 
memory.  
Common law ius soli was first codified in the British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act 1914, which was passed along with the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 of the 
same year, as a response to the outbreak of the First World War.19 After the Second 
World War, and as decolonisation accelerated, nationality legislation was codified in 
the British Nationality Act 1948. Under the 1948 Act, British people were designated 
‘Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies’, also known as ‘CUKCs’, the first use 
of citizen as the primary status, while citizens of independent states were known as 
Commonwealth citizens.  Previously, ‘British subject’ had been the main status; it 
was retained in the 1948 Act along for both CUKCs and Commonwealth citizens. 
Subjecthood carried rights of movement throughout the Commonwealth but, as these 
rights were progressively diminished through consecutive immigration statutes, its 
significance dwindled. After the BNA 1981, it denoted the lowest level of connection, 
describing a person with no citizenship or right of abode.  
 
2.4 Nationality, race and citizenship 
After the Second World War, race and immigration control became more explicitly 
intertwined in the UK. Extra labour was needed for post-war rebuilding, particularly 
in sectors such as health, hospitality, transport and manufacturing. There was a 
preference for European labour whose stay as aliens could be controlled and, in 
principle anyway, made temporary. In the event, however, major employers recruited 
labour from the Commonwealth, initially the Caribbean then South Asia. There was 
much official disquiet, public concern and even conflict but there was also hesitation 
in legislating; there was no desire to prevent the entry of white Commonwealth 
citizens, to disrupt Commonwealth links or to impose an obvious race bar.  (Dummett 
& Nicol 1990: 177 ff; Paul 1997: chapters 5 and 6; Hansen 2000; chapters 3 and 
4). Finally, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 was passed, imposing controls 
                                                
18 7 Coke Report 1a, 77 ER 377. 
19 Sect.1 (1) provided that ‘… any person born within His Majesty’s dominions and allegiance …’ was 
a ‘natural-born British subject’. 
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 which, although not apparent on the face of the legislation, would primarily affect 
subjects, both CUKCs and independent Commonwealth citizens, from non-white 
countries.  
Decolonisation created other new forms of immigration and new forms of 
discrimination. The population of South Asian descent living in the former East 
African colonies such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (Tanzania) were permitted 
to keep their CUKC status after independence as an insurance against policies of 
Africanisation, an anticipated reaction to former white British rule. Much of the 
substantial population of mostly middle-class Asian families therefore retained their 
CUKC, citizenship and did not take up citizenship of the new countries. In due 
course, their fears were realised and they began to arrive in the UK, where, however, 
they faced resistance to their admission  which translated directly into legislation. The 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 imposed entry controls on CUKCs who did not 
have a parent or grandparent born, naturalised, adopted or registered in the UK, 
thereby excluding the East African Asians.20  
The 1968 Act anticipated the Immigration Act 1971 which unified controls 
over aliens and Commonwealth citizens and retained the model used in the 1968 Act. 
The 1971 Act granted the right of abode to ‘patrials’ i.e. those who could show an 
ancestral connection with the UK (including some non-nationals), Commonwealth 
citizens who had been resident in the UK for five years and female Commonwealth 
citizens married to a man with the right of abode. Everyone else, including non-white 
British citizens in the remaining colonies, was subject to immigration control. 
‘Patriality’ says Dummett ‘had become a quasi-nationality’ (2005: 568). The term was 
later abandoned when the distinctions it embodied were reflected in nationality law in 
the British Nationality Act 1981 which designated CUKC patrials as British citizens, 
the only category of citizen with the right to live in the UK. The East African Asian 
CUKCs who had been made subject to controls in 1968 became British Overseas 
Citizens. The CUKCs who lived in the UK’s remaining dependencies became British 
Dependent Territories Citizens. Neither of the two latter groups had the right of abode 
in the UK, a position that was not remedied until early in the twenty-first century. 
Commonwealth citizens who were patrials when the 1981 Act came into effect 
retained their right of abode and form a dwindling but still extant group of non-
citizens entitled to live in the UK.  
The modern face of the historically changing definition of Britishness was 
examined in the case of Elias. This concerned the unhappy resolution of the sorry tale 
of the civilians interned in Japanese camps during the Second World War. Diana 
Elias, whose British family originated from Iraq and India, had been one of those 
handed over to the Japanese by the British Consul in Shanghai. Decades later, the 
British Government decided to try to end still-continuing calls for the Japanese to 
apologise and make reparations, which were souring political relations, by making its 
own ex gratia payment of £10,000 to each British former internee. After the scheme 
was announced, and some payments had been made, the eligibility criteria were 
changed to include only those who were, or whose parent or grandparent was, born in 
the UK. This excluded Mrs Elias, who by then had lived in the UK for decades as a 
British citizen herself. She took a case and won on the grounds of race discrimination, 
the Government inter alia not having noticed the relevant part of the Race Relations 
legislation coming into force.21 
                                                
20 The circumstances in which the Act was passed are a good example of how even basic constitutional 
rights are made fragile by the absence of entrenchment in the English legal system so that they are not 
more difficult to amend, than ordinary legislation. The 1968 Act was passed in a climate of high 
political and racial tension, in a matter of days. An MP, Enoch Powell, made a near-contemporary 
speech on immigration, referred to as ‘“the Rivers of Blood speech’”, which remains a widely-known 
and frequently-referred-to icon of establishment racism. 
21 Secretary of State for Defence vs Mrs Diana Elias [2006] EWCA Civ 1293. 
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2.5 Nationality and racism: the East African Asians case 
The impact of the apparent ‘immigration’ changes contained in the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act 1968 on the construction and operation of the law of British 
nationality  cannot be overstated, as their restatement in subsequent legislation 
including the British Nationality Act 1981 underlines. British people had historically 
been defined essentially by geography rather than descent, and that geography had 
been defined by the extent of political sovereignty under the Empire. After the Second 
World War, the boundaries of political sovereignty withdrew to the islands of the UK, 
but it was not easy to abandon responsibility for the British people outside those 
islands. In particular, the ‘patriality’ rule effectively meant that people from expatriate 
British communities, and their descendants, were still treated as British, whereas 
others were not, and the dividing line was effectively that of race. Broadly, white 
British Africans could come to the UK; black and Asian British Africans could not.22  
The European Commission of Human Rights found that the British policies were 
racist and thus in breach of the ECHR, but, by dealing separately with the particular 
people who had brought the claim, the UK was able to avoid the risk of adverse 
findings in the European Court proper.23 
The UK Government never accepted the implication that British nationality 
law was racist, (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2004: 208) although reforms in 
the mid-2000s recognised and partially remedied the historical injustices. 
Amendments to the British Nationality Act 1981 in the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 permitted those British Overseas Citizens, British subjects and 
British Protected Persons who do not have an alternative citizenship and who have not 
voluntarily relinquished another nationality to register as British citizens. The British 
Overseas Territories Act 2002 converted most of those who were British Dependent 
Territories Citizens as at May 21st 2002 (the date of commencement of the Act) into 
British citizens. The exception was those claiming a connection through the British 
sovereign bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus. It has been suggested that this is 
in accordance with the UK’s promise not to use the bases for civilian purposes, or 
because of fears that asylum seekers and other migrants in the Mediterranean area 
would be encouraged to use the bases to establish rights to come to the UK. 
Changes to nationality are always the likely consequence of decolonisation. 
The criticisms of the UK are firstly, that it abandoned overseas communities to whom 
commitments had been made or who were still governed from Britain and who had no 
alternative substantive nationality; secondly, that decisions about whom to accept and 
whom to reject were made on the basis of race; and, thirdly, that this was not openly 
acknowledged but achieved indirectly through immigration measures that cut across 
rather than complemented nationality laws and which then informed new hierarchical  
nationality laws which awarded unwanted citizens a nationality that did not fulfil a 
basic functional criterion, i.e. access to the territory. This was exacerbated by the loss 
of ius solis for some of those born on the territory. The worst injustices have now 
been remedied although their consequences continue to reverberate with disputes 
occasionally arising, for example, as to the entitlement to register. 
                                                
22 Commenting on the provisions for resumption of British citizenship in the British Nationality Act 
1964, which sought satisfaction of a ‘qualifying condition of connection with the United Kingdom’ or 
its colonies or protectorates, the European Commission of Human Rights (the then admissibility stage) 
remarked that ‘this condition would normally be fulfilled by the so-called ‘white settlers’, but not by 
the members of the Asian communities in East Africa’. East African Asians vs. UK (1973) [1981] 3 
EHRR 76, para 202. On the ‘hidden agenda’ of the 1964 Act, see further Dummett (2005:566). 
23 Case ref 
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 3.  Current British nationality and citizenship regime 
 
3.1 Citizenship by birth 
Under the current law, one may be born a British citizen through birth in the UK to at 
least one parent who is either a British citizen or settled in the UK or a member of the 
armed forces. ‘Settled’ is a technical term, meaning resident in the UK without 
restrictions and applies to those with indefinite leave to remain or permanent 
residence under EU law. It no longer matters whether the parent is the mother or 
father or whether or not they are married.24  
Ius solis was removed from temporary or irregular migrants by the British 
Nationality Act 1981. Those born after that time must produce evidence of their 
parents’ immigration status at the time of birth in order to obtain or renew a passport. 
It has also interacted with law in other areas to create new excluded groups. For 
example, before August 2005 a refugee received indefinite leave to remain 
immediately and thus was settled in the UK and able to give British citizenship at 
birth to any child subsequently born in the UK. Now, however, they receive five 
years’ limited leave before receiving indefinite leave and their children will not 
necessarily be born British although there are later opportunities to register as British 
once the parent is settled.25 These slower consequential changes suggest that the 
impact of the loss of ius soli in 1983 is only now being properly felt.  
Until 2002, a parent exercising free movement rights in EU law was regarded 
as sufficiently settled to pass British citizenship to a child at birth. In 2006, the 
position changed: regulations now provide that if the parent has a permanent right of 
residence, the condition is satisfied, but not if the parent is a ‘qualified person’, 
meaning a worker or job-seeker, a self-sufficient or self-employed person or a student. 
The condition is also not satisfied if the parent is resident as a family member of a 
resident or qualified person. However, after five years as a lawful resident under the 
free movement rules, a parent gains the status of permanent resident and can then pass 
British citizenship to a child born in the UK.26 
A person may be born a British citizen by descent, if born outside the UK to a 
British citizen otherwise than by descent. This form of citizenship, by descent, 
generally lasts only one generation. Thus for a child to obtain British citizenship from 
a parent who is a British citizen by descent, the child must either be born in the UK or 
other requirements met that show a continuing connection with the UK. There is 
however provision to register a child when the British parent’s own parent was a 
citizen other than by descent and either the child’s British parent lived in the UK for 
three years prior to birth or the family unit, after birth, lives in the UK for three years. 
However, if when the child is born outside the UK one parent is a member of the 
armed forces or diplomatic staff or working in some official European institution, the 
child will be a British citizen otherwise than by descent and able to pass British 
                                                
24 The child of a mother who is neither British nor settled only has to show proof of paternity to claim 
British citizenship through a British or settled father; this is satisfied by the father’s being married to 
the mother, or on the child’s birth certificate, or by blood or DNA tests, or otherwise (British 
Nationality (Proof of Paternity) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1496) ). This is however comparatively 
recent; until July 2006 an unmarried father could not automatically pass British nationality to a child, 
although registration would usually be permitted where the child would have been born British had the 
parents been married (SI 2006 1498). 
25 There are however generous practices for those children who are born stateless as a result of the 
parent’s country of origin’s not granting citizenship by descent for those born outside the territory, and 
there are also generous provisions and practices for the registration for children who are born and grow 
up in the UK. 
26 A child born before the parent achieves the five years’ residence may subsequently be registered. 
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 citizenship to children born abroad. British citizens, whether by descent or otherwise, 
have the right of abode in the UK. 
It is rare that individuals are born into one of the other categories of British 
citizen. Most British Overseas Territories Citizens and British Overseas Citizens 
without another nationality are now British citizens. Some individuals may still wish 
to naturalise as British Overseas Territories Citizens and thus transmit their 
citizenship but British Overseas Citizens is a declining category as it cannot be 
transmitted to children or acquired in other ways.  
There are a few residual groups. British Nationals (Overseas) are people from 
Hong Kong who applied for this status before Hong Kong passed back to China in 
1997.27 The term ‘British subjects’ now applies to two residual categories of people, 
and then only if and for so long as they have no other nationality: firstly, certain 
people who were formerly connected through British India, and secondly people who 
were connected with the Republic of Ireland and made a declaration in 1949 of 
retention of British nationality in 1949. These British subjects may find it relatively 
easy to naturalise as British citizens. British Protected Persons were connected with 
parts of the British Empire that were not directly ruled colonies but protectorates, such 
as Iraq, where the local ruler was at least nominally independent. People in this last 
category are not really considered to be British at all – they were not British subjects 
in the previous sense and they are not Commonwealth citizens now, but they are also 
not aliens. 
 
3.2 Becoming British after birth 
There are two routes to naturalisation: marriage or residence. Naturalisation through 
marriage is easier; applicants must be over eighteen years old, of sound mind and 
good character, have passed tests of English (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic) language 
and of knowledge of life in the UK, have indefinite leave to remain and to have lived 
in the UK for three years (subject to permitted absences) without being in breach of 
the immigration rules; the spouses or civil partners of those on Crown and designated 
service may apply from abroad.28 While only three years’ residence is required by 
statute, since July 2012, spouses must live with their partner for five years before 
obtaining indefinite leave so that the minimum period is now, de facto, five years.  
Those applying through residence must meet the above conditions except that 
the residence period is five years, of which one has been spent free of immigration 
restrictions (i.e. as settled residents), again unless a person is on Crown service.29 In 
addition, they must show that they intend to make their home in the UK. A person 
once naturalised is treated as a British citizen otherwise than by descent, and so can 
pass British citizenship to a child born outside the UK (see above). 
A particular and increasing barrier to naturalisation – as well as other 
applications - is the high cost of the fee, and the lack of any formal appeals process. 
The deterrent effect of the high fees is mentioned not only by Dummett in her earlier 
Report for this project (2005: 564, 575), but also by organisations active in the field 
(e.g. Refugee Council 2007) and those commissioned by Peter Goldsmith to research 
the background for his paper on Citizenship: Our Common Bond, discussed further 
below. By 2014, an application cost £826. 
                                                
27 Hong Kong Act 1985 and the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Order 1986. 
28 While the minimum residence period remains three years under statute, under changes to the 
immigration rules, all spouses must live in the UK and meet the conditions of their visa before being 
eligible for settlement, so that is now the de facto minimum. 
29 As with spouses, most migrants must wait for five years to obtain settlement and must then live for 
one year without being subject to restrictions before being eligible to naturalise so that the minimum 
period will, in reality, be at least six years for most.   
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 Language tests have become more formal and more difficult over the years 
and a knowledge test was introduced in 2005.30 In practice, most of those naturalising 
took the language and knowledge tests at the settlement (permanent residence) stage 
(where they became obligatory in 2007) and are not required to retake them to 
naturalise. Only those who settled prior to 2 April 2007 or who were exempted from 
the requirement after that date have to meet the integration requirements at the 
naturalisation stage (unless they are again exempt, although the exemptions are 
narrower for naturalisation than at settlement). 
Until recently, migrants could meet the condition either by taking the ‘Life in 
the UK’ test or by taking and progressing satisfactorily on a specially designed 
English language with citizenship course. From October 2013, all migrants have been 
required both to take the citizenship test and pass a separate language test at B1 CEFR 
(unless they are a national of one of a list of English speaking countries or took a 
degree taught or researched in English).31  
The Home Office must state its reasons for refusing naturalisation.32 The 
decision is discretionary; British Nationality Act 1981, s. 6 says that the Secretary of 
State ‘may, if he sees fit’ grant naturalisation if conditions are met. However, refusals 
are, in practice, always founded on failure to meet the requirements. Some of these, 
however, such as the good character criterion, involve an element of subjectivity. 
There is evidence that, while the number of refusals is falling overall, the proportion 
of refusals on good character grounds is rising and, in 2012, was the reason for 37% 
of refusals compared to about 10% previously (Migration Observatory 2014). 
There is no appeal against refusal of naturalisation. UKBA will review the 
decision on request and for a fee but are likely to reverse a refusal only if they have 
made an error, for example, in calculating the residence period, not on the 
discretionary grounds such as ‘good character’. Otherwise, the only way to obtain 
judicial oversight is to apply for judicial review of the decision by the High Court on 
the grounds of illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or breach of human 
rights and/or proportionality. Judicial review is heard in the Administrative Division 
of the High Court and is a highly formal and legally focused process for which 
specialist legal representation is required. It will therefore be very expensive unless 
the applicant qualifies for and is granted legal aid, an increasingly unlikely prospect. 
In practice, few applications succeed because, leaving aside cost, the discretionary 
nature of the decision, particularly where refusal is on ‘good character’ grounds, 
means that it will rarely be unlawful.   
Some individuals may register as a British citizen. This is similar to 
naturalisation but is a simpler process, with lesser elements of discretion although a 
good character requirement usually applies to those aged over 10. Those with a 
nationality connection to the UK but who are not British citizens may register as 
British Citizens subject sometimes to a residence condition. Registration is the 
method for formerly British people who renounced their citizenship and wish to take 
it up again, for certain residual categories of people from Hong Kong such as war 
widows, and for those born to British mothers outside the UK before 1983, after 
which citizenship in these circumstances became automatic. People who become 
British by registration are sometimes British by descent and sometimes British 
otherwise than by descent, depending on the relevant provision. 
There are also provisions for the registration of children, including where a 
child is born in the UK to a foreign parent who subsequently becomes settled, 
children who are born in the UK and not entitled to citizenship but live here until they 
                                                
30 The official languages are Welsh and Scottish Gaelic as well as English, though the importance of 
English is generally given as a reason for having language tests at all. 
31 http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/2012/june/13-family-migration. 
32 R v SSHD ex p Mohammed Fayed [1996] EWCA Civ 946. 
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 are ten years old, children born in the UK before July 2006 whose mother is foreign 
and whose unmarried father is British (after that date citizenship is automatic),33 and 
children born stateless in the UK. Registration may also be a route to citizenship for a 
child born outside the UK to a British citizen by descent, who normally cannot pass 
citizenship outside the UK for a further generation. While these rights appear quite 
extensive on paper, they can be difficult to exercise. The cost of an application for 
registration (currently £669) can be difficult or impossible to raise and those caring 
for non-British children may not realise the importance of ensuring registration occurs 
while the child is still a minor. This includes social services who may have parental 
responsibility for the child. The good character requirement has been used to refuse 
registration to those with very minor criminal records such as a caution; it should be 
remembered that the individuals concerned are amongst the most vulnerable in our 
society yet even peripheral involvement in crime as a young person can have 
devastating consequences for their future. The subsequent exclusion from 
opportunities for higher study, work and a settled life causes huge emotional distress 
to the youngsters involved (Ealing Law Centre 2014). 
A child can also become British by adoption if at least one adoptive parent is a 
British citizen at the date of adoption, and the adoption order is made by a relevant 
court,34 or after May 2003 if the order is made under the 1993 Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption and the adopters are habitually resident in the UK at the date of 
adoption. If the adoption is not within these categories (for example, where the 
parents are resident overseas), an application for registration can still be made before 
the child is 18, and, if the child would have been British if it were the adopters’ 
biological child, that is likely to succeed. An adopted person does not cease to be 
British for reason of the annulment of an adoption order, and nor does a British person 
adopted abroad cease to be British for that reason, even if it leads to their gaining 
another nationality.  
For many years there was a route to settlement (and in due course 
naturalisation) after ten years residence for regular migrants and fourteen years for 
irregular migrants, subject to conditions. The period before settlement has now been 
extended to thirty years for irregular migrants.35 Unlawful residence includes any time 
before removal directions are made, so this is a possible route for someone who 
disappeared into the social fabric when the approach to physical immigration was 
laissez-faire, but who is now discovered to be present without formal status and 
therefore in difficulties as to paperwork although the extended qualification period 
means that fewer people will now qualify. By definition it is not known how many 
such people live in the UK,36 but many are long-established residents with houses, 
jobs and families.  
 
                                                
33 SI 1498/2006, bringing into force sect. 9 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
34 One in the UK, Channel Islands, Isle of Man or Falkland Islands after 1982, or after 21st May 2002 
in another British Overseas Territory. 
35 Paras 276 ADE-DE HC395. 
36 In May 2006 Dave Roberts, the Home Office Director in the Enforcement and Removals Directorate 
within the then Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home Office, was widely reported as 
telling the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs that he had ‘not the faintest idea’ 
how many people were in the UK ‘illegally’ (a term deprecated by lawyers and others in the context of 
immigration) (Response to Q 815, Minutes of Evidence, Tuesday 16 May 2006; Fifth Report printed 13 
July 2006). The figure was however generally estimated, including by Mr. Roberts, at about 400-
500,000, or up to 1% of the population, with adjustments for those from the new accession states. This 
approximate figure seems to have been confirmed by independent researchers (Gordon et al 2009). 
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 3.3 Losing British citizenship 
A person who renounces British citizenship in order to take up nationality in a country 
that does not permit dual nationality is entitled to register so as to become a British 
citizen again, but only once (s. 13 British Nationality Act 1981). After that, it is 
discretionary only. There are no current suggestions that citizenship should be 
withdrawn for those residing permanently or long-term abroad, although non-citizens 
with indefinite leave to remain can lose their right to return to the UK after two years 
absence. 
Deprivation of citizenship by the government has emerged as a critical issue in 
recent years. The original s. 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, reproducing 
existing powers but extending them to registered citizens, allowed deprivation of 
naturalised and registered citizens on the grounds of fraud, false representation or 
concealment of a material fact. There was also power to deprive on the grounds of 
disaffection, disloyalty, engaging with the enemy during wartime or imprisonment for 
more than twelve months within five years of acquiring nationality, but only if this 
would not leave the person concerned stateless. Powers of deprivation were barely 
used at that time; the last denaturalisation had occurred eight years before the 1981 
Act was passed and none occurred in the decade afterwards (Gibney 2014: 329-330). 
However, the events of September 2001 caused new anxieties about terrorism. 
S. 4 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 replaced the disaffection 
etc. grounds in the 1981 Act with a single clause allowing deprivation of citizenship if 
the person had done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK or 
a British overseas territory. This applied to all citizens irrespective of how citizenship 
had been acquired so included those who were British by birth but could not be used 
if the result would be statelessness. There was also a right of appeal. The background 
included general concern about security and widespread media coverage of the Home 
Secretary’s inability to deport Abu Hamza al-Masri, an objectionable Muslim 
preacher originally from Egypt who had naturalised following his marriage to a 
British woman. However, in the event, he could not have his citizenship removed 
under this new provision because he no longer possessed Egyptian nationality.   
Two years later, s. 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants 
etc) Act 2004 made appeals against deprivation orders non-suspensive so that 
individuals did not retain their citizenship during the appeal process with drastic 
consequences discussed below. A further ‘war on terror’ case, Hicks,37 was the 
apparent catalyst for still further change although, as Majid (2008) suggests, the July 
2005 bombings of public transport in London were also in the background. David 
Hicks, an Australian national interned by the US at Guantanamo, applied to register as 
a British citizen by descent - his mother was British, entitling him to do so - in order 
to obtain release along with the other British citizens. The Home Secretary initially 
refused to register him but, after this was found to be unlawful, proposed to withdraw 
his citizenship immediately thereafter. This was prevented by the Court of Appeal 
after careful consideration of the legislative provisions which, it was found, did not 
permit deprivation in respect of conduct that occurred before nationality had been 
acquired. At the material time, which was prior to the registration he now sought, he 
owed no allegiance and so by definition could not have been disloyal (see Sawyer 
2013 for a discussion). 
The new measure, s.56 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, allows 
the Secretary of State to make an order of deprivation of citizenship if she considers it 
to be conducive to the public good. There was considerable concern expressed at the 
breadth of the power (see Sawyer 2013 for a discussion). The provision came into 
force immediately and is mirrored in s.57, which allows for the deprivation of the 
right of abode for the same reason. The ‘conducive to the public good’ terminology 
                                                
37 [2006] EWCA Civ 400. 
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 was present in earlier deprivation of citizenship laws, where it acted as a restraint: 
deprivation on other grounds could only go ahead if it was also ‘conducive to the 
public good’. It is also used as a ground for deportation, where it has been 
expansively interpreted, and its use in this way in deprivation cases reflects the 
increasing tendency to treat naturalisation as an issue of immigration control and 
national security rather than of citizenship policy.  
Numbers of deprivation orders began to increase from 2010. For many years, 
no such orders were made. In 2009, two people were deprived of their citizenship and, 
in 2010, five (Fransman 2011: 609). A Freedom of Information request in July 2011 
revealed that thirteen orders had been made under the ‘conducive to public good’ 
provision.38 By 2014, that number had increased to at least 25, and that may be an 
underestimate. At least five of those deprived under this law were born in the UK. 
The number of deprivations on fraud grounds also appears to be increasing: there was 
one case in 2012 and 12 in 2013 (Ross 2014). A recently adopted tactic is to issue the 
order while the individual is outside the UK; 15 of the 17 ‘conducive’ deprivation 
cases examined by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism were made in this way 
(Ross 2014). Notice of deprivation is sent to the home address in the UK and the 
individual may only discover their predicament when attempting to return to the UK 
by which time appeal rights may have expired.  
Enabling its (former) citizens to be exiled in this way means that the British 
state avoids the difficulties it has faced in expelling non-nationals, both legal 
obstacles, such as human rights-based objections, and practical ones, such as 
identifying a state willing to take the person, and which would apply to an even 
greater extent to those who had only just stopped being British citizens. The Court of 
Appeal has upheld the government’s refusal of admission for the purposes of 
attending an appeal, finding that deprivation of citizenship was an exercise of the 
Crown's prerogative powers and, in the absence of a statutory suspensive right of 
appeal, the common law did not require a person to be present in person at his own 
appeal.39 This makes it much more difficult for rights of appeal and for human and 
other legal rights (for example, in EU law) to be exercised. There is the difficulty 
involved in finding and instructing lawyers from remote regions with poor 
communications but it may also be a question of physical security; at least one person 
deprived of their citizenship was killed by a drone strike after using skype (not in 
connection with an appeal) and some of those affected by deprivation orders have 
decided against giving evidence in their appeal, citing reasons of personal safety 
(Ross 2014).  
UK consular assistance is not available to these individuals, who are treated as 
non-citizens from the moment of deprivation. Two individuals (including the instance 
mentioned above) have been killed in drone strikes and another has been rendered to 
the US, raising suspicions of collaboration between US and UK security services. One 
of those killed was misleadingly reported to be a ‘very senior Egyptian’ commander 
in Al Qaeda even though he was born in the UK and had never asserted his Egyptian 
citizenship (Ross 2014).   
The current provisions are, in practice, indistinguishable from a right of 
arbitrary deprivation, although they are in accordance with the law. The sole 
substantive bar is that the person must not be left stateless when an order is made on 
‘conducive to public good’ grounds (there is no prohibition on leaving a person 
stateless if their British nationality is found to have been obtained by fraud). Given 
the breadth of discretion granted to the Secretary of State and the lack of clear (or 
any) rights in EU and human rights law, that an order will leave someone stateless is 
the only ground of appeal likely to succeed. However, establishing statelessness is 
often difficult and requires the British courts to decide on complex issues of foreign 
                                                
38 http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/decisionnotices/2012/fs_50411501.ashx 
39G1 v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 867. 
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 citizenship laws.  This can result in lengthy and repeated hearings as succeeding 
decisions are challenged and overturned.  The Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission in Abu Hamza found that statelessness must be de jure to be unlawful.40 
In B2, the Court of Appeal overturned a SIAC judgment to find that the failure by a 
state, here Vietnam, to apply its own laws (as understood by the British court) made 
an individual de facto stateless and therefore was permitted.41  The case had been 
heard in the Supreme Court and judgment was awaited at the time of writing42 but 
reports suggest that the critical arguments turned on whether Vietnam had effectively 
removed B2’s citizenship before or after the UK order, raising the alarming prospect 
of states racing to be the first to denationalise its unwanted dual citizens, and whether 
EU law applied. 
Another Supreme Court case, Al-Jedda, prompted yet another tightening of the 
law, in this instance enabling deprivation to take place in some circumstances even if 
statelessness follows. Mr al-Jedda appealed in 2010 against a deprivation order on the 
basis that it left him stateless. A series of decisions followed until, in 2012, the 
Supreme Court found that  the reasons for statelessness or the possible availability of 
an alternative nationality were immaterial; if Mr al-Jedda became stateless at the 
moment of deprivation, it was prohibited.43 In response, the government brought 
forward an amendment of the Immigration Bill, now s.66 Immigration Act 2014, 
which allowed the government to remove citizenship from naturalised citizens, even if 
this resulted in statelessness, where the Secretary of State was satisfied that 
deprivation was conducive to the public good because the person had conducted him 
or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK. 
This revived a declaration made in 1966, at the time of ratification, under art.8(3) of 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which allowed the UK to 
continue to exercise its existing powers to remove citizenship on limited grounds even 
though these would otherwise have breached the prohibition on statelessness in the 
Convention. In fact, the statutory power that it possessed at the time of ratification 
lapsed when the British Nationality Act 1981 was amended by the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 but the UK appears to be within its rights to 
resurrect it. 
The proposal that the UK should act to make people stateless shocked many. 
The compliance of the new provision with international law seemed dubious, 
notwithstanding the declaration to the 1961 Convention.44 The House of Lords 
rejected the changes and substituted clauses requiring the need for such a drastic 
power to be determined by a committee of parliamentarians and for new legislation to 
be introduced if the government then decided to proceed. These were, in turn, 
reversed when the Immigration Bill returned to the House of Commons but the 
government conceded that the power would only be exercisable if it was reasonably 
believed that another nationality could be obtained. There is also an obligation to 
report on the use of the powers of deprivation resulting in statelessness (Harvey 
2014). 
Thus, as amended, s.40 British Nationality Act 1981 now contains an array of 
powers of deprivation, all in the discretion of the Secretary of State and subject to a 
non-suspensive right of appeal which will, in all cases involving national security, be 
heard in semi-secret by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. These powers 
                                                
40 Abu Hamza v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSIAC 23/2005 
41 B2 v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 616. 
42 Case ID: UKSC 2013/0150 
43 Al-Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62. 
44 See, for example, the submission of Professor Guy Goodwin-Gill to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights:  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/GSGG-
DeprivationCitizenshipRevDft.pdf. 
Report on United Kingdom
RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 2014/1 - © 2014 Authors 17
 may be exercised in respect of all types of British national; not only British citizens 
but British overseas territories citizens, British overseas citizens, British Nationals 
(Overseas), British protected persons, and British subjects. Deprivation may now take 
place where the Secretary of State is satisfied: 
• That registration or naturalisation was obtained by concealment of a 
material fact (applies only to naturalised or registered citizens but may be used even if 
it causes statelessness); 
• Where the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive 
to the public good (applies however nationality was obtained but may not be used if 
the result is statelessness); 
• Where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is 
conducive to the public good because the person has conducted him or herself in a 
manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom or 
its territories (applies only to naturalised citizens but the order may be made even if it 
causes statelessness). 
It will be some time before it is known whether and how the power to make a 
person stateless has been exercised. It will be of doubtful utility if the person is still in 
the UK, as, leaving aside the human rights and other obstacles to expulsion, it will not 
be possible, in most cases, to find another country to accept them (although the Home 
Office has previously issued directions to remove a person to a country of which he is 
not a citizen).45 To the extent that all deprivation decisions must be proportionate to 
be lawful, any such decision which results in statelessness must be subjected to 
particular scrutiny given the horror with which statelessness is generally regarded.  
The UK’s current law and practice on deprivation of citizenship has four 
major and disturbing implications. The first is that, by removing citizenship when an 
individual is outside the UK, the government is forcing other states to take 
responsibility for managing the danger that this person supposedly represents. The 
desire to dump undesirable citizens as if, in the words of Shami Chakrabarti (Director 
of Liberty), they are ‘toxic waste’46 is even more apparent in plans announced shortly 
before this report was updated in November 2014. The Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Bill, introduced to the House of Commons on 26th November 2014, contains 
powers to seize the passports of those who, it is suspected, are intending to leave the 
UK to participate in terrorism related activity. It also has powers to prevent British 
citizens (presumably those who, as sole nationals by birth, cannot be denationalised) 
from re-entering the UK except under onerous conditions. Both deprivation to prevent 
re-admission and the proposed exclusion orders raise significant questions of 
international law under which states have obligations in respect of their citizens (or 
former citizens).47  
Secondly, it is not at all clear that this strategy will make the world a safer 
place overall; deprivation outside the UK has gone ahead even where the security 
services have advised that the risk could be better managed within the UK (Ross 
2014). Thirdly, citizenship law once again reflects the modern political obsession with 
protecting the populace from external threat, whether through immigration or 
terrorism, rather than with any recognisable conception of citizenship as a political 
and legal bond. Finally, citizenship status is now highly variable in terms of the 
                                                
45 See e.g. Revenko v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 500, MA v SSHD [2005] UKAIT 00161; KA 
(statelessness: meaning and relevance) [2008] UKAIT 00042, MM and FH (Stateless Palestinians, KK, 
IH, HE reaffirmed) Lebanon CG [2008] UKAIT 00014 
46 http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/14/uk-jihadists-citizenship-laws-human-rights 
47 See the submission of Professor Guy Goodwin-Gill to the Joint Committee on Human Rights:  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/GSGG-
DeprivationCitizenshipRevDft.pdf 
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 degree of security and permanence which it provides. Only British born citizens 
without an alternative nationality are immune from deprivation (although they could 
be made subject to exclusion orders). Those with a dual nationality and those who 
have naturalised may see their citizenship removed. It is probable that a greater 
proportion of these latter groups will belong to the UK’s ethnic minorities. While 
many of the former injustices associated with British citizenship were moved in the 
early years of the twenty-first century, recent years have thus seen new axes of 
exclusion and discrimination emerge. 
 
3.4 Nationality, immigration and the Commonwealth  
The Commonwealth of Nations is the shadow of the old Empire but still has 
considerable emotional power. Almost all of its member states are previous countries 
of the Empire, but not all former British territories are members.48 In a striking 
reversal of the previous position, a person from a Commonwealth country does not for 
that reason have any particular advantage in relation to British citizenship rights, 
though many people do have rights rooted in the historical connection with the UK.  
Some citizens of Commonwealth countries still have the right of abode in the 
UK granted to them by the Immigration Act 1971 and others are citizens by descent 
(although this ends after one generation unless a connection with the UK is 
maintained through residence). Others may be able to use a provision in the 
immigration rules that allows those with a grandparent born in the UK to work and, 
after five years, settle in the UK without having to meet the usual criteria for a work 
visa. The remaining British Overseas Citizens and British Dependent Territories 
Citizens are subject to immigration control (the only concession is access to the youth 
mobility scheme which replaced the working holidaymaker scheme) but have rights to 
register instead of naturalising as British citizens if they meet the conditions. 
Otherwise, particularly since the abolition of the working holidaymaker visa in 2008, 
the position of Commonwealth citizens who are not British citizens is 
indistinguishable from other non-nationals.   
 
3.5 British nationality and citizenship law and its external relationships  
Britain’s citizenship laws are not apparently much directly affected by formal 
relations or agreements with foreign states.49 In relation to the European Community, 
the UK decided that only British citizens, and not other British nationals, would be 
European citizens, and this was upheld by the Luxembourg court in Kaur.50 However 
policy towards certain categories of British nationals is clearly affected by 
international politics.  Gibraltarians were British citizens from the inception of the 
                                                
48 The Irish Free State became the Republic of Ireland and left; Malaya became part of Malaysia, and 
Newfoundland became part of Canada. Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged as Tanzania; Zimbabwe was 
suspended and then withdrew. In 1961, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth  because of 
pressure against its then apartheid policies, and the Commonwealth also participated in sanctions 
against the regime (Commonwealth Accord on South Africa October 1985), before the ending of 
apartheid and the rejoining of South Africa in 1994. Applications to join the Commonwealth have been 
made by Sudan, Algeria, Madagascar, Yemen and the Palestinian National Authority; Mozambique and 
Rwanda have joined. 
49 More obvious in this area are expulsion policies, where the UK has been anxious to expel foreign 
nationals to countries which have a reputation for ill-treatment of their citizens that would make such 
expulsions amount to a breach of Art 3 EHCR. Britain has obtained ‘readmission’ agreements, 
effectively agreements by the home country not to torture those returned. These agreements were 
always controversial. 
50 Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237, confirming the Declaration made in 1972 and appended to 
the Treaty of Accession to the European Community. 
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 British Nationality Act 1981 that created the status: Gibraltar is a British territory 
physically in southern Spain and over which Spain has a claim. The inhabitants of the 
Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, which are claimed by Argentina, were 
British Dependent Territories Citizens until the armed conflict of 1983, after which by 
the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983 they became British citizens (they 
are also entitled to Argentinean nationality but the white-European settler population 
does not generally claim this). They would have been reclassified as British citizens 
under the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 in any event. 
A particular example of poor treatment of British nationals is that of the 
British inhabitants of the Chagos Islands, whose fate expresses a great deal about the 
constitutional meaning – or lack of it – of British nationality and citizenship. The 
inhabitants of the British Indian Ocean Territories were deliberately evicted by the 
British Government in the late 1960s so that the largest island, Diego Garcia, could be 
leased to the United States for use as an air base. Most went to live in Mauritius where 
they underwent much privation. In 2000, the High Court declared the prohibition on 
their return unlawful, and compensation was paid.51 A further decision favourable to 
the Islanders was made in 2006.52 Orders in Council made under the Royal 
Prerogative to prevent further action by the islanders were declared unlawful by the 
Court of Appeal in 2006,53 but the Government successfully appealed to the House of 
Lords in 2008.54 The Chagossians are still unable to return to their previous home 
although they were granted British citizenship under the British Overseas Territories 
Act 2002.  
 
3.6 ‘Foreigners within’?: British people who may also be nationals of other 
countries 
Within the UK, substantial populations possess or are entitled to the citizenship of 
other states. Although the attribution of British nationality was until the 1980s based 
on the mediaeval idea of allegiance to the monarch, British law has generally been 
accommodating of dual nationality. Britain is a mixed society in which, for example, 
emigration to the former colonies and return from them, or families spread across 
countries, have long been relatively common. There are therefore substantial numbers 
of people who have, or are eligible for, the nationality of another country, some but 
not all of whom may be perceptible as ‘ethnic minorities’. The decision to retain 
another nationality will depend on several considerations. A person might choose to 
be British in order to secure a useful European passport. On the other hand, countries 
which forbid dual nationality might deprive non-citizens of desirable rights, such as 
the right to retain ownership of land in that country, and, as the lack of formal 
citizenship has historically been unimportant in Britain, a person might choose not to 
naturalise for that reason.55  
By removing total ius solis, the British Nationality Act 1981 introduced the 
idea that even UK-born people might be legal foreigners. The ‘time immemorial’ 
before which questions need not be asked has gradually receded, as more and more 
                                                
51 R vs Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ex parte Bancoult [2000] EWHC 
(Admin) 413. 
52 R vs Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ex parte Bancoult [2006] EWHC 
(Admin) 1038. 
53 R vs Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ex parte Bancoult [2006] EWCA 
Civ 498. 
54 R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
[2008] UKHL 61. 
55 For example, in the case of the Guantanamo detainee Bisher Al-Rawi, he was said not to have been 
naturalised because he was the one ‘chosen’ to maintain the family’s claim on land in Iraq. 
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 individuals have to establish the status of their parents at the time of their birth. 
However, anyone born in the UK before 1983 would have been born British, so the 
cut-off date falls after the immigration of a substantial community from the Caribbean 
and the Indian subcontinent. Those most affected by the loss of ius solis have 
typically been the children of asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants for whom return to their country of nationality is extremely problematic. 
Some of these children may eventually be entitled to register as British citizens if they 
avoid removal for the first ten years of their life.56 Meanwhile, as discussed, changes 
to the law of deprivation of citizenship have affected dual nationals and naturalised 
citizens, drawing a greater distinction between those whose ancestral roots are outside 
or inside the UK.  Attempts to deport more foreign nationals convicted of criminal 
offences have also resulted in the removal of substantial numbers of long-term foreign 
residents, including those who have been resident since childhood and know no other 
life.  
 
3.7 Citizenship and human rights 
The UK has had several cases on nationality heard in the European Court of Human 
Rights. The East African Asians case, already discussed, came close to succeeding but 
the government succeeded in settling the case before it was fully heard.  Abdulaziz, 
Cabrales and Balkandali, in 1985, while it established that article 8 may be engaged 
by immigration controls and that discrimination on grounds of sex was not permitted, 
found that discrimination between nationals on the basis of their place of birth was 
justified. Sorabjee and Jaramillo confirmed in 1995 that  rights incidental to 
citizenship, such as the right of a person to live in their own country, would not be 
protected by the Strasbourg court, at least so far as this concerned British children 
expelled with their foreign parents. 57 Although this was consistent with previous 
cases, the expectation had been that the partial move away from ius soli would make a 
difference, not least because part of the ratio of earlier decisions had been a view that 
the acquisition of British nationality by children whose foreign parents were passing 
through the UK at the time of their birth was somehow less valid than if the British 
nationality system had required the parents to be citizens or at least long-term 
residents.58 The position of citizen children however has improved after the decision 
in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4. which found that a child’s best interests 
included the right to grow up in its country of nationality and that this must be a 
primary consideration when making immigration decisions about their parents. The 
case was made possible by the removal of the UK’s immigration exemption to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the creation of a statutory duty to make 
children’s interests a primary consideration in immigration decisions (although Lady 
Hale’s lead judgment suggested that this added little to existing article 8 obligations). 
While there is no absolute prohibition, it is now unlikely that a parent will be removed 
if the result is that a citizen child will also have to leave the UK. 
Also at the domestic level, it was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
Harrison that citizenship and immigration are not matters that attract the protection of 
Article 6 ECHR (the right to a fair trial in the determination of civil rights).59  
 
                                                
56 S.00 BNA 1981. 
57 See note 16 above. 
58 For closer discussion of these cases see Mole 1995. 
59 Harrison vs Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 432 
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 3.8 Gender inequality in British nationality law 
Historically there was considerable discrimination against women, both as regards the 
status of women on marriage, and mothers’ ability to pass British nationality to their 
children, but these have largely disappeared. Following the Naturalisation Act 1870, 
women lost their British nationality on marrying an alien but this was eventually 
remedied by the British Nationality Act 1948 (for a discussion, see Wray 2011: 
chapter 2).  
Recent moves have led to gender equality in the ability to obtain British 
citizenship through both parents equally. Mothers gained the right to pass citizenship 
to their children as could fathers as from 1983, under the British Nationality Act 1981, 
and such children born before 1983 but after 1960 could subsequently register as 
British. Under the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, the children of 
British mothers will be able to register as British even if they were born outside the 
UK before 1961. Unmarried fathers were unable to pass British citizenship to their 
children, even if they were born in the UK, until in July 2006 sect. 9 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 at last came into force. Regulations 
were also made governing the meaning of ‘father’, including, as well as the husband 
of the mother, men recognised as legal fathers under the relevant legislation and those 
whose biological paternity was proved by, inter alia, DNA tests or court order.60 This 
did, however, still apply only to children born after June 2006; however, the Home 
Office has discretion to register those born earlier, as well as those whose parents 
subsequently become settled in the UK (see above) and the position has recently 
remedied by legislation (s.65 Immigration Act 2014 which is not in force at the time 
of writing). 
 
3.9 Institutional arrangements peculiar to the UK 
The UK constitution does not have any entrenched status and British nationality and 
citizenship law can be changed through ordinary legislation. The principle of 
parliamentary supremacy, which was one outcome of the Civil War, means that 
Parliament may legislate as it chooses and may not bind its successors.61 Accordingly 
rights may change almost overnight, especially in a political response to media 
pressure.62 Nationality is governed by statute law but this often permits secondary 
legislation of which there is little scrutiny.63 There is a widespread tendency, in 
nationality and immigration as elsewhere in government, to pass ‘enabling legislation’ 
which gives Ministers broad powers to change the law through secondary legislation. 
Entry and stay in the UK is governed by rules made under the Immigration Act 1971. 
The Immigration Rules are also subject to only minimal parliamentary scrutiny, but 
the Supreme Court has found that rules governing entry and stay must be made 
through the Immigration Rules and cannot be contained in ‘policy guidance’ or 
                                                
60 See note 70 and the British Nationality (Proof of Paternity) Regulations 2006 (SI 1496/2006). 
61 This principle is now of doubtful applicability in EU law where only full repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972 would enable subsequent legislation to be applied in contravention of EU law. 
62 Media pressure led to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, for example, being passed in a few 
days; in a heady post-Twin Towers atmosphere, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
came into force before it was published (R (L and another) vs Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; Lord Chancellor’s Department, interested party T.L.R. 30 January 2003), and publicity 
led by a well-known actress led to Gurkha soldiers who had fought for the UK being given leave to 
remain in the UK in April 2009 (as Nepalese nationals they had previously been refused such leave). 
63 Secondary legislation may be subject to positive or negative resolution. In the former case (which is 
more unusual) they must be approved by Parliament. More often, they are subject to negative 
resolution  which means they are laid before Parliament and become law unless a resolution is passed 
against them. 
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 similar.64 It is therefore not, in practice, difficult for governments to change aspects of 
nationality law or of those parts of the immigration rules which affect eligibility for 
naturalisation (such as qualification for settlement) in line with political priorities.  
As already mentioned, the grant of naturalisation is always discretionary and 
may, in theory, be refused even if the applicant meets all the criteria although in 
practice, refusal is always on one of the statutory grounds, particularly good character, 
and an explanation is always given and, indeed, may be required on the grounds of 
fairness. As mentioned above, refusals may be challenged through judicial review and 
there is a tendency to cede doubtful cases to avoid them becoming judicial precedents 
binding on subsequent courts under the UK’s doctrine of precedent.  The Secretary of 
State does not have power to exercise discretion in favour of applicants except to the 
extent permitted by statute. 
                                                
64 R (on the application of Munir and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 
UKSC 32; R (on the application of Alvi) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 33. The immigration rules are subject 
to negative. 
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4.  Current political debates and reforms 
 
Although the current changes to citizenship and related laws mentioned above are the 
subject of formal political debates and legislation, these have often been 
overshadowed and obscured in the media by a broader debate over the meaning of 
‘belonging’ and ‘citizenship’ in a modern diverse and, as the Scottish referendum 
demonstrated, fractured nation.  At the same time, the departure of some young 
people to fight in Syria has recently triggered a much more specific debate about the 
circumstances in which the rights associated with citizenship, notably the right to 
enter one’s own country, may be abrogated. Unfortunately, this debate has been 
conducted with little regard to the responsibilities of states towards their own citizens 
and towards other nations where these supposedly dangerous individuals may be 
stranded. 
 
4.1 Political parties and citizenship policy 
The major parties in Britain are the Labour and Conservative Parties, with the Liberal 
Democrats as a smaller third party. After the 2010 election, in which neither of the 
two major parties achieved an overall majority, the Liberal Democrats formed a 
Coalition government with the Conservatives. However, both the home affairs and 
immigration ministerial posts are held by Conservatives and Conservative policy has 
been dominant on these issues. There are also smaller parties who, under the UK’s 
first-past-the–post voting system do not have significant parliamentary representation. 
These include the Green Party, who have a single MP, and, more recently, the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) who have recently won two by-elections caused 
by the defection of Conservative MPs to UKIP and whose anti-European and anti-
immigration policies are beginning to wield considerable influence on the policies of 
the mainstream parties, particularly but not only the Conservatives.  
There has been considerable devolution of power from the central UK at 
Westminster to Scottish and Welsh authorities, especially the former; although at 
present citizenship policy is not devolved, In 2005, the Scottish National Party policy 
campaigned in the General Election for a return to ius soli in Scotland as part of a new 
Scottish constitution on independence (SNP 2005: 29) but this commitment did not 
appear in the guide to an independent Scotland published by the Scottish government 
for the independence referendum published in 2013 (see Ryan 2014 for a discussion). 
The referendum, which was held in September 2014, resulted in rejection of 
independence by a narrow margin. As a result, Scotland has been promised the 
devolution of more power but not, so far, over immigration and citizenship  
Leaving aside the current Coalition government, power in Britain overall has 
been held by either Labour or Conservative governments for many decades and, as 
Dummett points out: ‘Policy on nationality has followed a more or less continuous 
line regardless of which party has been in power’ (Dummett 2005: 576). The 
end of Empire led to a shedding not only of political power in the colonies and 
overseas territories (complicated by a desire to retain economically useful links)65 but 
also of responsibility for their people. The major structural changes in British 
citizenship law were implemented by Conservative governments: the creation of the 
quasi-nationality status of ‘patrial’ in the Immigration Act 1971 and the loss of ius 
soli and the creation of a hierarchy of citizenship statuses in which only the most 
privileged had the right to live in the UK in the British Nationality Act 1981. 
However, the Labour government laid the way through the Commonwealth 
                                                
65 Hong Kong remains an important seat of international trade; the Falkland Islands may prove to be 
important in laying claim to oil or minerals in the Antarctic region. 
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 Immigrants Act 1962 which disguised changes to nationality law as an immigration 
measure.  
In general, immigration issues have overshadowed questions about citizenship 
whether Labour or the Conservatives have been in power. The removal of the Labour 
government and the establishment of a Conservative-led coalition government did not 
lead immediately to any significant change of direction although immigration policy 
became even more restrictive. Broadly speaking, policy has focused on curbing 
immigration, the enforcement of the social and economic exclusion of those without 
immigration status, naturalisation, and removing the unentitled physically from the 
country.  
In response to the growth in support for UKIP and to pressure from within the 
Conservative Party itself, there has been increasing emphasis on the need to restrict 
‘EU migration’ without linking it in any coherent way to the privileged movement 
that UK citizens themselves enjoy throughout Europe. The Conservative Party is 
pledged to a referendum on EU membership if it wins the 2015 election and the Prime 
Minister David Cameron, who is not personally committed to leaving the EU, appears 
to have decreasing room for manoeuvre in his efforts to draw the heat from the issue. 
At the time of writing, the focus is increasingly on access to welfare by EU citizens 
rather than the principle of free movement itself where it is clear that there will be no 
concessions from the EU.   
Nationality has recently come back into focus following, as already discussed, 
changes to the law on deprivation and increased confiscation of passports but is still 
far from being a mainstream issue. Citizenship is rarely discussed except in the 
context of immigration or, increasingly, security and there are only limited and, to the 
general public, abstruse differences amongst the political parties. To an extent, this 
apparent vacuum of policy on citizenship is filled by the policies on immigration, 
current citizenship debates being viewable as relating to naturalisation policies which 
do, of course, deal with current immigrants. The 1997-2010 Labour government is 
widely regarded, even by its own leaders, as having allowed too much immigration 
and the Coalition government adopted the Conservative’s manifesto pledge to reduce 
‘net migration’ to the tens of thousands, a target which it has little chance of meeting 
by the 2015 election.  
The smaller parties, which have no realistic hope of governing alone, can 
perhaps afford to be more equivocal, generous or extreme. Liberal Democrat policy, 
prior to entering into Coalition, was more nuanced and moderate than Conservative 
and even Labour electoral policy (Symonds 2012). The Green Party has no clearly 
stated policy on immigration at all, let alone citizenship, though it has issued a 
statement of principles. The United Kingdom Independence Party, whose dominant 
characteristic is its hostility to the EU, has no stated policy on citizenship other than a 
minimum five year waiting period (which is already effectively in place) although it is 
generally opposed to immigration whether from inside or outside the EU.  It 
campaigned in the 2010 General Election on a policy of ‘freezing’ immigration for 
five years with only very limited entry thereafter, and ensuring greater compliance 
from those migrants already in the UK. Notable in very recent years is the rise of the 
British National Party and its entry into mainstream political life. It has had some 
limited and usually temporary success over several years in local council and 
European elections in more economically deprived areas such as east London and the 
north of England. However, this did not translate into gains in the 2010 General 
Election and, since then, the party appears to have lost votes to UKIP and currently 
has little impact. The BNP is broadly the current manifestation of previous far-right 
nationalistic parties such as the National Front, which flourished in the 1970s but did 
not go so far into the mainstream of achieving formal political power. It campaigned 
in 2010 on a policy of a complete end to immigration and, unusually for a political 
party, has a citizenship policy, vowing to review all recent grants of citizenship and 
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 residence to check that they are ‘appropriate’. They also support the ‘voluntary’ 
repatriation of immigrants aided by ‘generous financial incentives’.66 
 
4.2 The trajectory of recent reform proposals 
In 2006, the Labour Government announced a review of the immigration system with 
the aim of consolidating legislation, including on citizenship. During the summer of 
2007, it consulted on Simplifying Immigration Law, and the Green Paper (formal 
Parliamentary document proposing legislative reform) The Path to Citizenship, was 
published for consultation in the spring of 2008. The background was concern at the 
apparent failure of some communities of immigrant descent to integrate satisfactorily 
into mainstream society and the emergence of apparently ‘segregated communities’. 
Anxiety was heightened after the London bombings of 2005 perpetrated by British 
citizens, all educated and three out of four born in the UK. Nonetheless, critics widely 
challenged the presumptions upon which policy was based (see, for example, Finney 
and Simpson 2008). 
The White Paper was foreshadowed when Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
commissioned the former Attorney General Peter Goldsmith to write a paper on 
‘citizenship’. The result, Citizenship: our Common Bond, was published in February 
2008, together with the academic work commissioned by him for the paper. The 
scope of both the paper itself and the work commissioned for it tended to elide the 
two main political questions surrounding ‘citizenship’, namely to whom citizenship 
should be attributed – who is or should be British – and the issue of the meaning of 
Britishness.67 It may be for this reason that it does not give an impression of being a 
full or satisfactorily rigorous examination of any the issues, though it was widely 
reported in the media, with emphasis on his enthusiasm for citizenship ceremonies 
and civic participation.  
The Government Green Paper The Path to Citizenship proposed radical 
changes to both settlement and naturalisation.68 The subsequent Borders, Citizenship 
and Immigration Act 2009 created a framework for reform including the novel 
concept of ‘active citizenship’ which would require those seeking naturalisation to 
undertake some form of community service outside the home. Indefinite leave to 
remain was to be replaced with ‘permanent residence’, which would generally take 
longer to acquire than citizenship, and ‘probationary citizenship’, which was not a 
form of citizenship but another immigration status. It appeared that the children of 
those on probationary citizenship would not be born British citizens in the UK and the 
number of children born either stateless or without British nationality despite their 
parents’ lengthy residence would have increased.   
The ethos behind The Path to Citizenship and the 2009 Act was an odd 
mixture in which naturalisation as an extension of immigration control competed with 
a desire to strengthen the bonds of citizenship. The result was a complex structure of 
doubtful legality and practicality. While the Act was passed, the sections relating to 
naturalisation were not implemented and were abandoned by the Coalition 
government who have, as earlier mentioned, focused their energies principally on 
blocking routes of entry and settlement. The underlying narrative and aims have 
                                                
66 http://www.bnp.org.uk/policies/immigration  
67 Although this does appear to take a very wide view of the remit put forward by Gordon Brown (at 
Appendix A of the paper), it is clear from his comments in a national newspaper (Goldsmith 2007) that 
Lord Goldsmith considered this appropriate and important: ‘We seem to take for granted what 
citizenship stands for. Our shared history may have held us together in the past but our society has 
changed a great deal. …’ 
68 A government document issued as the first stage of formal consultation on proposed reforms. A 
White Paper generally follows, with a more formal statement of government policy. 
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 remained the same but the Conservatives, who lead on immigration and nationality 
within the Coalition, appear more ruthless and direct in how they are achieved. They 
do not need euphemisms such as probationary citizenship to explain exclusionary 
policies nor are they embarrassed to raise the bar for settlement, with consequences 
for naturalisation and to denaturalise British citizens either officially or de facto.  
Nonetheless, the fact of having had a discussion on the meaning of citizenship 
beyond it being an accident of birth or the natural consequence of residence marks a 
new departure in British thinking on the subject, even if it is one that reflects wider 
concerns, shared with many European neighbours. These relate to the challenge of 
maintaining a cohesive national society which contains substantial minorities of a 
different ethnic descent and cultural background whose transnational bonds remain 
strong in a globalised and insecure world. The reflex seems to have been towards an 
assimilationist rather than a more open pluralistic perspective and this is a trend that is 
currently continuing, characterised by a new ruthlessness in which those citizens who 
are judged to have failed in adopting liberal values may find themselves excluded as 
easily as immigrants prevhave always been. 
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 5. Conclusion  
 
Although the territorial borders of the UK appear stable, in citizenship terms they are 
only now being consolidated. After a long historical period of gathering in people 
from all over the world from whom the British monarch claimed allegiance, 
citizenship law in the UK has developed since the mid-twentieth century largely to 
exclude those based abroad and to limit those who may come to or remain in the UK 
itself. Citizenship law has always been a tool of immigration policy and it is being 
used to define a nationality to which people may belong when previously belonging 
was a matter of geography and practice.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Britain had no clear or real boundaries – ius soli operated throughout the Empire, so 
that many people were British subjects who would never expect to go to the UK at all, 
and the borders were in practice open to immigrants. This meant in practice that 
anyone could come to the UK and be British in a single generation. Yet by the end of 
the century, legislation was already well developed that would confine both territory 
and population to the UK.69 The partial loss of ius soli in 1983 was a fundamental 
cultural change, the implications of which are only now working through. The 
provisions for being born British and becoming British might now look more like the 
situation in other European countries, but reaching that result has entailed a radical 
transformation. 
The abandonment of parts of the old Empire has often been painful and 
controversial. It was accomplished largely through redefining many British nationals 
as non-citizens and potential immigrants. Legislation towards this began in the 1960s 
when the concept of ‘patriality’ was first developed, before being consolidated in the 
Immigration Act 1971: British subjects who were not born in the UK, and did not 
have a parent or grandparent who was born there, were made subject to immigration 
control should they try to enter the UK. A variety of forms of British nationality was 
set up under the British Nationality Act 1981, of which only one, British citizenship, 
carries the automatic right of abode in the UK. The other British national categories 
are gradually being reduced, either because those in the categories cannot pass the 
nationality on, so they die out, or because some of the categories are transferred to 
British citizenship.  
The effective closing of the borders to non-European immigrants has likewise 
largely been accomplished legally if not actually.  There is a significant section of the 
UK=resident population that has a dubious immigration status or no such status at all. 
As the culture changes from one of belonging by residence and participation to one of 
belonging by entitlement and descent, those present in the country, as well as those 
wishing to enter, have to be checked for legal compliance and this is becoming a more 
extensive feature of British life. Given the ambiguity that characterises British 
nationality law, some people who lack status do not realise it; sometimes queries are 
raised only on an application to renew a British passport, when it is said that it should 
not have been issued. Unlawful residents (first defined in 2002) are being separated 
out, and much political effort, public expense and media attention is devoted to their 
physical expulsion, although this often proves a problematic process for legal or 
practical reasons. Debate around the expulsion of irregular or even regular migrants 
who have been convicted of offences has become a primary conduit for the expression 
of hostility to the Human Rights Act. After many years of adding complexity, the 
previous Labour government’s last task before leaving office was a project of legal 
reform that aimed to ‘simplify’ both citizenship and immigration law, making them 
clearer and easier to operate while making naturalisation more difficult. Little was 
achieved however despite some popular resonance.  
                                                
69 It is true that some overseas populations are now British citizens (Gibraltarians and Falkland 
Islanders), but this assists in the project of reducing the scope of non-citizen nationals and, more 
importantly, retains and strengthens valuable land claims for the UK. 
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 The trend towards increasing complexity has continued under the Coalition 
government with the accretion of new layers of immigration rules piled on top of the 
existing structure, resulting in a byzantine edifice in which the true legal position is 
difficult even for experts to discover. This may not be entirely undesired. If the 
government wishes to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands, one way is to 
make the rules of entry inaccessible. While the process of naturalisation has largely 
escaped this recent new complexity, the requirement of establishing lawful stay 
through the qualifying period of residence, combined with exorbitant fees at every 
stage of the process, can only increases barriers to naturalisation. Meanwhile, the 
position of those who do become citizens is becoming more precarious particularly 
for those who are naturalised citizens or who have maintained links through 
citizenship to another country. 
The problem of making functional legislation is proving more difficult, the 
problem being exacerbated by the lack of any established and informed academic or 
professional debate about immigration and citizenship law. Despite recent attempts to 
raise the profile of the subject and make it more central to legal education, it is still 
often considered to be mainly a political or sociological issue, rather than a legal one 
where legal expertise might be central to explaining the current position or assessing 
potential reforms. The current story of confining the British to within the boundaries 
of the UK will also have to encompass treating Ireland as a properly foreign country. 
Though currently this may appear already to be largely the case,70 in practice the 
persistence of the Common Travel Area, by which the borders between the countries 
are open, had blurred the point, and many people also hold both Irish and British 
citizenships. There have been proposals, not adopted, to abolish the Common Travel 
Area,71 overturning centuries of historical connection. Something on which no change 
appears to be proposed is the power of Parliament to alter or withdraw what in most 
countries would be basic constitutional rights: this power is most graphically 
expressed in the fate of the Chagos Islanders, who many years after being expelled 
from their homes by subterfuge were told by the House of Lords that it was properly 
within Parliament’s power to remove their right of abode.  Indeed, the trend under the 
current government is away from strengthened protection for individuals under the 
norms of international or European law. 
The broad political trajectory of UK citizenship law is relatively easy to see; 
historically-based anomalies are being removed and the system is being brought into 
line with a more classic mixed system of partial ius solis and ius sanguinis. 
Ambiguity as to status is being removed, with more migrants being either refused 
entry or treated as temporary visitors or guest workers. It remains to be seen however 
how easily the political impetus can be translated into legal provisions that work as 
intended, and what the side-effects may be. It may not be easy to limit interim and 
safety-net categories, or to limit human rights challenges to the deprivation of 
residence and other rights, especially where these are enjoyed by longer-term 
residents whose circumstances have changed unexpectedly. It may also be difficult to 
ensure that checks on the status of apparent foreigners do not affect settled and 
settling communities, to the detriment of British society as a whole.  
It was always likely that the dismantling of an empire would lead to profound 
changes in citizenship status and immigration laws. Many have argued however that 
this was achieved through the use of overt and covert racial categorisations and that 
immigration policy drove nationality law rather than the converse, which would seem 
both more logical and more principled. Stark race discrimination is now unacceptable, 
legally, socially and politically, and some of the worst excesses in nationality law 
have been ameliorated. However, new distinctions have emerged which are still 
                                                
70 There have been separate citizenships since the declaration of Eire as an independent republic and the 
Ireland Act 1949 in the UK. 
71 See Goldsmith 2008 and the original draft of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill. 
Report on United Kingdom
RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 2014/1 - © 2014 Authors 29
 largely based on considerations of immigration control which, in its turn, draws on 
global inequalities that often coincide with the old racial categories. The process of 
achieving a secure status, which once involved little more than entry, has become a 
prolonged and complex process which does not end even with the acquisition of 
citizenship as the growth in use of deprivation orders shows.  
This is perhaps a reaction less to decolonisation than to globalisation. Many of 
the new migrants are not from colonial territories or, at least, not from those who were 
most involved in the immigration of the 1950s and 1960s. There is also the fear that 
an easy route to citizenship has been exploited by those who might wish to harm the 
UK through terrorism. This must not be dismissed but such instances, and the 
publicity they attract, can provide useful cover for policies that principally affect the 
least secure and powerful of the UK’s residents. The pool of insecure irregular or 
temporary migrants, and their children is a growing if under-reported feature of 
modern life in Britain that the turn towards restriction whether at entry, settlement or 
citizenship does nothing to address.  
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